This is a relatively simple proposition in that it asks us to take an “in principle” decision to allow
differential pay for Members and sets out a process for enacting that decision should the Assembly
vote pour. I will come to the arguments for the proposition shortly, but I would like to offer a few
words of explanation to describe exactly what the proposition delivers and what it does not deliver.
Members will be aware that under the States of Jersey Law Article 44(1), all Members must be paid
the same. That Article says: “No scheme, agreement or other arrangement whatsoever for the
remuneration of, or the payment of any allowance to, elected members out of the consolidated funds
shall provide for different elected members to be entitled to receive different amounts of
remuneration or allowance.” Part (a) of the proposition asks P.P.C. (Privileges and Procedures
Committee) to bring forward the relevant amendments to the law to delete this clause and allow for
differential pay. I did not bring those amendments to the law myself, because I was advised that it is
not normal practice for Back-Benchers to change the law, not least because there may be
complications, for example, consequential amendments to the laws that a Back-Bencher would not
necessarily pick up, and I thank the Greffier and the Chair of P.P.C. for their consultations that I had.
While I think that is unlikely there are likely to be those kind of complications, I think it is best to
stick to good practice. There are 2 points to make about a vote in favour of part (a) of the proposition.
The first is that our vote today is not irrevocable. It is an “in principle” decision that could yet be
reversed when P.P.C. bring forward the relevant legislative change, and perhaps the chair of P.P.C.
can indicate in the debate when she expects this to be the case. The second point to make is that part
(a) is the real meat of this proposition. It is the key decision because it sets in train a change in the
law. It would remove the bar that currently exists against differential pay. It is important to
remember that we, or rather a previous Assembly, have already handed the power to set our pay to
the remuneration reviewer. We do not determine our own remuneration. The law says that whatever
the reviewer recommends will be implemented. There is currently only one limitation, and that is
the limitation imposed by Article 44(1). Passing part (a) of the proposition would begin the process
of removing that bar on differential pay, still subject, as I say, to a further debate when the relevant
law change is brought back by P.P.C. One final point to clarify regarding part (a), I have indicated
to Members that I will take the proposition in parts, and if part (a) is rejected, then part (b) I believe
will automatically fall away, and if it does not, I will seek leave to withdraw it. However, if part (a)
is passed, then part (b) gives further guidance to P.P.C. and the reviewer by specifying the categories
that would be recommended for the reviewer to consider. As I have said, I will take this section of
the proposition in parts, so there will be a vote on each individual role. It is important to acknowledge
that this part of the proposition is not binding on the reviewer. That is true in both directions, so to
speak, so we might vote to include all the categories I have listed in the reviewer’s deliberations, but
the reviewer still does not have to award them all differential pay. The wording of the proposition
makes this clear. It requests the Privileges and Procedures Committee to include differential pay for
Members within the terms of reference of the next remuneration reviewer, such terms to include the
possibility of applying different payments for the following roles. We are voting to include the
possibility of applying different payments for these roles. The final decision lies with the reviewer.
It is also true that if we vote to exclude a category, that is again only advice to the reviewer. However,
passing part (b) would mean that when P.P.C. directs the new reviewer to consider differential pay
after the next election, their terms of reference will include only those roles that have been voted for.
Legally, the reviewer would be entitled to make their own decision, but I have to say that it would be
fairly extraordinary for a reviewer to step beyond their own terms of reference. Members will note
that the proposition, if enacted, places considerable power in the hands of the remuneration reviewer.
So, why do that? I think the answer is for the very good reason that this is the system we already
have, and I think it is a good one. I would like to publicly put on record my thanks to the remuneration
reviewers. They have done a great service to the Island, and to us in the Assembly. They have
brought a sensible, calm, respectful and thoughtful approach to their remit. Their reasoning has been
thoroughly researched and clearly explained. There have been no decisions that have looked like
outliers. The application of that expertise has, perhaps not coincidentally, helped to detoxify the
question of our pay. That is something that is good, and that is why I have no problem with allowing
the remuneration reviewer to continue to set our pay, even if it also includes differential pay for
Ministers and other roles. I should add that the reviewer suggested in a recent report that the matter
of variable pay be brought back to the Assembly. So, the answer to the question why bring this now,
is because the reviewer asked for us to reconsider the matter. So, with that rather lengthy preamble
out of the way, let me get on with the arguments for the proposition. There is, I think, one overarching
reason why we should allow differential pay for it to be at least considered by the remuneration
reviewer. It is about offering appropriate recognition and reward for taking on Ministerial or other
significant responsibility. In almost all walks of life, additional responsibility leads to greater reward.
That is a good principle in itself. It encourages people to do more and recognises their additional
contribution financially. But beyond that simple principle, the case rests on making standing for
election a more attractive proposition. Some Members may be uncomfortable with the idea that there
should be a financial incentive to the consideration of whether to stand and whether to seek a
Ministerial position. I am afraid we crossed that Rubicon a long time ago when we agreed that
Members would be paid. Our predecessors made that change wisely to widen the pool of candidates
accepting that not everyone has independent means and that it is legitimate to expect reward for
political service. This proposition would take that one step further and, in doing so, align us with
practically every other jurisdiction in the world, including Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and many other
comparable jurisdictions. As I say, in the world outside politics, people are rewarded for taking on
extra responsibility. They have an expectation that if they do well in their job, they will move up
through the ranks, earning more money. Then what happens when they consider politics? Maybe
they are young, maybe they are mid-career. We are asking to take something on that breaks with
their normal and legitimate expectations. It is entirely legitimate to expect that taking on more
responsibility will result in financial reward. As we go through our life, certainly in the professions,
people expect their earnings to increase. It is true in the private sector, public sector, trade unions,
the third sector, and so on. We have to remember that some Members may come into this Assembly
quite young. They may want to start a family, or buy a house, or in other ways progress their lives.
Were they to stay outside the Assembly, they might have expectations of promotion or other
mechanisms to increase their pay. That is how life goes. The nearest equivalent we can offer in
politics, and it is not an exact equivalent, but the nearest equivalent we can offer in politics is that
Ministers and other senior roles should get more pay. That engages another reason why I think this
change is a step forward. It would make our Assembly a little bit more like the society we represent.
We already accept this goal in other areas. We want the Assembly to reflect the gender balance, the
ethnic variety, different age groups, and so on that we find in society. We might also consider that it
would be wise to reflect the reward structure that is prevalent in society. I think at this point we have
to take a step back here, because this vote is not about us, or at least not principally about us. We all
chose to stand knowing the system as it is. We were not deterred. We accepted the present system
and needed no further encouragement to stand. But that is not the point. We have to think about
other people who did not stand, people who might in the future be considering standing. This is
about thinking about those who do not stand might want. I have been told by many of them that
standing for election would be more attractive if a more modern reward structure were in place. I do
not claim that this change will change the world. It is a modest change. It will not utterly transform
the political landscape. I doubt it will lead to a veritable flood of new candidates. But it will make
the idea of going into politics more attractive to a wider group of people, and that is a good thing.
With regard to part (b), I do not propose to make the case for each individual category in detail, but
simply to remind Members that the rationale for the proposition was to reward individual
responsibility. My personal view is that the case for the Chief Minister and for Ministers to receive
additional pay is easy to understand and, in my view, the easiest to justify. I think my views were
helped formed in this during the COVID times when the then Chief Minister had to take decisions
with life and death consequences for Islanders. We may have disagreed with some of those decisions,
but the fact is they were very weighty decisions, and it struck me at the time, when I was not involved
in politics, as slightly absurd that that responsibility did not attract any further reward compared to
other Members. As far as Assistant Ministers are concerned, I note the comment of the remuneration
reviewer who said that their view was that additional pay would only apply where an Assistant
Minister had delegated legal responsibilities. I happen to agree with that view, but in the end is a
decision for the reviewer if we give that category to them. Perhaps the most controversial or marginal
inclusion, if you like, is Scrutiny chairs and panel chairs and so on. I have included them, because
under the U.K. system they are also included as they are recipients of differential pay. I think the
remuneration reviewer should have the widest possible remit, remembering that they do not have to
give differential pay to any of the categories that we vote for. I will therefore be voting for all the
categories so as to enable the reviewer to have as wide a remit as possible. However, I understand
some Members may wish to limit the reviewer’s scope, and that is why I am taking that section of
the proposition in parts. So, what of the arguments against this proposition? The original argument
to put the ban on differential pay in place came from then Senator Syvret. He argued that additional
pay for Ministers would tempt Members to compromise their principles for financial reward. It
would encourage potential abuse of power through the exercise of patronage.
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Members would be tempted to be obedient and servile to those in a position to offer a Ministerial
position, with its accompanying financial reward, so we would be encouraging naked ambition. I
must say, looking back over Jersey’s recent political history, there are those who might say such
behaviours do not need any financial encouragement. Twenty years ago, there were perhaps
justifiable fears that the shift to a Ministerial system, when tied to increased pay for Ministers, would
encourage the wrong sort of behaviours. But the ban on Ministerial pay has been in place for more
than 20 years, so Members can judge for themselves whether the lack of Ministerial pay has had the
desired effect. My own case would be that the existence of questionable behaviours that are
motivated by a desire to achieve higher office undoubtedly exist, but they do so independently of any
potential financial reward. As evidence, I would respectfully submit that the performance of Jersey’s
political system has not been any different in this respect from any other country that does pay
Ministers more. I struggle to see what noble behaviours have been so conspicuously promoted in
Jersey and so lacking in other jurisdictions that are subject to the corrupting influence of Ministerial
pay. Twenty years on, I feel confident in saying that the instruction of Ministerial pay is highly
unlikely to significantly change the behaviour of Members in the lead up to the selection of
Ministerial positions, all of which are ultimately in the gift of this Assembly anyway, rather than
handed out by patronage. It is perhaps an argument that introducing higher pay to attract more
candidates is in some way an inferred criticism of Ministers or office holders in place now, that we
do not have high enough quality candidates, and only by Ministerial pay can we attract better
candidates. That is not my argument. My argument is that variable pay will help widen the pool of
potential candidates. Those new candidates might be an improvement, they might not. That is not
the point. My point is that it is better to have more candidates. We should want to widen the pool of
candidates from whichever part of the political spectrum they come. Competition for places is good,
and I am sure anyone standing for election would want to test themselves against a variety of
candidates; the more the better. There is an argument against this proposition on the grounds that it
will make no difference but costs money at a time when the Government is not balancing its books.
On the subject of money, it is impossible to say how much it will cost, because we do not know what
the remuneration reviewer would do with their newfound flexibility. But I estimated in my report
that it would be no more than £250,000 based on the kind of statements that they have made in the
past about this subject. It is not an insignificant sum but, given the potential improvements to the
functioning of our democratic system, I think it is a modest investment. So, that is one side of the
argument, but the other side is the idea that it will make no difference. I beg to differ. I have been
contacted by plenty of people who do not want to put their head above the parapet to say it publicly,
but who are absolutely clear that the absence of Ministerial pay is a disincentive to some people to
stand. In conclusion, I know there will be some public opposition to this, but not perhaps as much
as we might think. Certainly, there has not been much opposition expressed when I posted on social
media about this, and I have not picked up a strong argument against, so it may not be quite as
controversial as maybe some Members think. The truth is there will never be a right time to bring
this proposition. I have brought it because the remuneration reviewer suggested it should be debated,
and because I believe in the principle. I think the time has come for this simple modernisation, but I
look forward very much to hearing Members’ views.